>>>>jimmyh wrote:
Just because you don't understand the importance of precision in cases like this does not mean that precision is not important in cases like this.
>>>Empirically false jimmy.
>>So you're saying that the fact that you don't understand the importance of precision in cases like this *does* mean that precision is not important in cases like this?
>No. It is not what I’m saying or have said.
That is the direct negation of the thing you said is false, which makes it directly equivalent to your statement I was responding to.
Disagreement does not equal misunderstanding.
Disagreement does *not* equal misunderstanding, this is true. I think you may have missed my point, so I'll see if I can explain better.
Proving a negative is a difficult thing. In order to be able to justifiably state that there exist black swans, all one needs is a single example. If you see a black swan, you know that at least one exists. In order to justifiably state that "black swans exist" is *empirically false*, you need to be able to justifiably claim to have seen all swans and found none of them to be black. In order to say that you've seen all swans, you have to be able to claim that there exists no place that a swan could be hiding that you didn't see. In other words, you'd have to have checked all possible places such that it is not possible for there to be a black swan that you failed to see. Empirically proving a negative is a difficult thing to do, and that makes "empirically false" quite a bold claim.
Saying "x is important in cases like y" is "empirically false" is equivalent to saying "it is empirically verified that there exist no consequences of x that have any importance". Making that claim *is* making the claim that one's inability to find a connection of x to importance means that there is none to be found -- since if it's possible that you've missed something then you cannot be said to have empirically verified that there's nothing about x that makes it important.
Saying that the idea that precision is important here is "empirically false" is far stronger than "I disagree, as it is my personal belief that precision is unimportant here", and even if you were to have only said the latter, and even if you were to be right that precision is unimportant here, it would *still* be a lack of ability to understand, since "I believe that precision is unimportant here" directly implies that you can't find any connection between precision in cases like this and things which are important.
You can disagree about whether it’s important if you want, and that's fine. But there is a difference between "disagreeing because you have empirically verified that there exist no considerations which link precision in cases like this to things of importance" and "disagreeing because you simply cannot find any such consideration, even though you know that you could potentially be missing an important connection".
Which is your claim?
A person that does not believe in hypnosis will see a suggestion that they cannot remember their name as an obvious lie.
This is also empirically false. Plenty of people who do not believe in hypnosis end up getting hypnotized anyway, and then accepting suggestions such as these. Suggestibility is not the same thing as belief in hypnosis.
Those that believe in hypnosis will frame it differently, that the suggestion that they can’t remember their name is not a truth, until the person accepts the suggestion as true.
And again, empirically false. I “believe in hypnosis”, and I’ll tell you that the person who has accepted the person who has accepted the suggestion that they can’t remember their name is just wrong about whether they can remember their name. They believe it, and therefore they do not test. However, even as they are responding to the suggestion the *reality* remains that “they can stop imagining whenever they want”. And again, it’s not *just* me. Plenty of competent hypnotists agree with me here.